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This paper is based on the conjecture that institutional details matter and 
that attempts to estimate the economic effects of federalism by drawing on 
a simple dummy variable neglect potentially important institutional details. 
Based on a principal component analysis, seven aspects of both federalism 
and decentralization are used as variables for explaining differences in (1) 
fiscal policy, (2) government effectiveness, (3) economic productivity, and 
(4) happiness. The results show that institutional details do, indeed, 
matter. Different aspects of federalism impact on the outcome variables in 
different degrees. This study adds to our knowledge on the transmission 
mechanisms of federalism and decentralization. 
JEL classification: H 71, H11. 
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The Economic Effects of Federalism and Decentralization 
1 Introduction 
Currently, some two dozen federally structured states exist implying that out of 
some 200 sovereign states, every eighth state has a federal structure. Yet, some 
40% of the world population (i.e., around two billion people) live in federal states. 
Moreover, there seems to be a trend towards decentralizing ever more government 
functions. Even “paradigmatically unitary states” like the UK or France are 
decentralizing or “devolutionizing”. Enough reason to look at the economic 
effects of federalism and decentralization.  
In a companion paper, Blume and Voigt (2008) derive seven different aspects of 
federalism and decentralization by drawing on principal components: (1) token 
executive elections, (2) sub-national expenditure, (3) fiscal independence, (4) sub-
national democracy, (5) federal veto, (6) federal competence and (7) composition 
of parliament. Empirically, these aspects can be found in various combinations 
implying that federally constituted states can be highly centralized and states 
constituted in a unitary fashion can be highly decentralized (e.g. in terms of 
subnational expenditure). Based on these insights, we hypothesize that a cross 
country analysis interested in the economic effects of federalism and 
decentralization should not rely solely on federalism dummies as some empirical 
studies in the past have done as potentially crucial institutional details are not 
explicitly taken into account. 
In this paper, we ask whether the different independent aspects of federalism and 
decentralization identified in the companion paper have effects on (i) fiscal policy, 
(ii) government effectiveness, (iii) economic productivity, and (iv) happiness. We 
run regression analysis for a cross section of up to 80 countries. Drawing on a 
federalism dummy often leads to results that are very different from those reached 
have by drawing on the seven aspects. In some cases, both the dummy and some 
of the seven aspects turn out to be significant. In these cases, use of the more 
detailed variables allows more detailed statements regarding the underlying causes 
provoking the effects. In other cases, the dummy does not show up as significant 
but one or two of the more precise variables do which is even more valuable as an 
additional insight. 
Three aspects seem to have strong effects on economic variables: electing 
municipal governments locally, endowing federal units to veto at least some 
federal-level legislation, and the fractionalization of parliament in terms of the   3
heterogeneity of interests represented there. Interestingly, these three dimensions 
display problematic effects both on fiscal policy variables (they are connected 
with higher budget deficits and spending on social and welfare services) and 
government efficiency (being connected with lower levels of government 
efficiency and higher levels of corruption). Yet, both labor and total factor 
productivity are significantly higher in federally constituted states. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops our hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents an overview over the empirical evidence on the effects of 
federalism and decentralization. Section 4 shortly reviews the results of our 
companion paper. Section 5 contains the description of the regression analysis and 
possible interpretations of the results. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Some  Theory 
One of the foremost students of federalism, William Riker, was very critical 
regarding its economic consequences. Riker (1975, 131) argues that, due to the 
large variety in the organization of federal states, a theory about the operation of 
federalism was “probably impossible”. He is quite explicit in his doubts 
concerning the relevance of this particular constitutional feature (1975, 155): 
“Nothing happens in a federation because of the federal constitutional 
arrangements that could not happen otherwise in fundamentally the same way.” 
Over the last number of years, some scholars have begged to differ and to 
ascertain outcomes that emerge precisely because a state is constituted along 
federal lines. 
The conjecture that federalism could have relevant economic consequences can 
draw on a number of theoretical traditions: Relying on Hayek (1939), one branch 
of the literature argues that more information on the functioning of government 
techniques is produced when constituent governments simultaneously try out 
various solutions. Another branch, going back to Tiebout (1956) and re-enforcing 
the information argument, claims that competition by constituent governments for 
mobile citizens gives constituent governments incentives to provide their 
populations with a bundle of collective goods that reflects their preferences at a 
competitive price. These two branches both deal with aspects of horizontal 
competition between various government units. Another literature (Olson 1969, 
Oates 1972) deals with vertical competition, i.e. the relationship between the 
federal and the state level (and in particular potential externalities). Closely 
related is the literature that deals with common pool and (or) moral hazard 
problems of federalism, in particular the difficulty of the federal level to credibly   4
commit not to bail out single constituent states. Better information and (or) more 
adequate government incentives are conjectured to have far-reaching effects on 
government spending, the quality of governance and, at the end of the day, on 
income and growth. 
With regard to possible effects that federalism and decentralization could have on 
our four groups of dependent variables, namely fiscal policy, government 
effectiveness, overall productivity and happiness, arguments often point in 
different directions such that the expected sign of the coefficient is unclear ex 
ante. The empirical tests become all the more important. The benefits of federal 
structures are expected to originate from the competition between constituent 
governments (i.e. from non-cooperation) whereas the costs are due to the 
necessity to cooperate on some issues (i.e. from cooperation).  
Possible Effects on Fiscal Policies 
Hayek (1939) has argued that competition between governments would reveal 
information on efficient ways to provide public goods. Assuming that 
governments have incentives to make use of that information, this can be 
translated into two hypotheses with regard to fiscal policies, namely hypothesis 
#1a: C.p., federal states have lower expenditures (both central government and 
total government) than unitary states and the corresponding hypothesis #2a: C.p., 
federal states have lower revenues than unitary states. This very idea has been 
picked up under various names more recently; yardstick-competition is one of 
them (see, e.g., Salmon 1987 or Besley and Case 1995).2 
The argument first published by Tiebout (1956) is a little more complicated: In his 
model, the lower government levels compete for tax paying citizens which would 
give the lower governments incentives to cater to their preferences. One could 
thus expect federally organized states to produce fiscal policies more in line with 
the preferences of the median voter on the local or state level. Whether this 
automatically translates into lower taxes, lower budgets and lower deficits is a 
different question because such an argument implicitly assumes that the median 
voter would always wish taxes, budgets and deficits to be low. 
                                                 
2   In this section, many competing hypotheses concerning the effects of federalism will be presented. 
The hypotheses presented by supporters of federalism are denoted with an “a” whereas those of 
the critics are denoted with a “b” after the number.   5
Unequivocal predictions concerning the direct effect of a federal structure on 
revenues, expenditures, and debts are, hence, impossible. On the other hand, a 
rather indirect effect should be the consequence of Tiebout: if (fiscal) policies are 
more in line with citizen preferences in federal than in unitary states, then the 
legitimacy of federations should be higher, c.p.. This should result in lower 
monitoring costs for tax compliance which should, in turn, imply that deficits are 
lower both due to a lower degree of tax evasion and less resources spent on 
monitoring tax payers. Hypothesis #3 thus reads: C.p., federal states should enjoy 
higher levels of legitimacy than unitary states.  
Until now, we have focused on the possible benefits of a federal constitution. We 
now move on to its possible costs. The multi-centered, i.e. federal, provision of 
public goods could imply that the overall number of bureaucrats is higher than in 
unitary states. Everything else equal, this would translate into higher expenditures 
/ deficits in federal states. Additionally, some cooperation between the central 
government and the constituent governments is required. Resources need to be put 
into coordinating various activities. What is more, if both levels of governments 
pretend to have the final decision-maker power in some policy areas, conflict 
about the interpretation of these policy areas appears likely. Working to resolve 
these conflicts will also eat up some resources.3 All of these considerations would 
make us predict that expenditures should be higher in federally constituted states 
than in unitary ones (hypothesis #1b) and, correspondingly, that revenues and (or) 
deficits should also be higher there (hypothesis #2b). 
The constitutions of federally organized states are difficult to change. This means 
that the number of states, their borders, but also their competences etc. will be 
rather stable. This can also entail costs: re-allocating tasks presupposes the 
consent of those who will not be in charge anymore. Their consent seems unlikely 
(unless some [possibly efficiency-reducing] compensation is offered). In other 
words: the rigidities inherent in federalism prevent an efficient (re-)allocation of 
tasks. Even if the current number and size of states is optimal for the provision of 
one public good, it is unlikely that it will be optimal for the provision of all public 
goods. Given that the existing number of states is too high, economies of scale 
cannot be realized. Tanzi (2000), e.g., suspects that those providing public goods 
will be insufficiently specialized. These considerations tend to re-enforce 
hypotheses #1b and 2b. 
                                                 
3   Riker (1975, 144) has put this succinctly: “Lawyers, especially constitutional lawyers have a little 
more work in a federation than in a unitary system: otherwise there is not much difference.”   6
It can be argued that government deficits are simply the difference between 
revenues and expenditures and that there would, hence, be no need to explicitly 
deal with deficits in addition. This evaluation might be premature if incentives to 
incur debts differ systematically between federal and unitary states. Given that 
lower level government units in unitary states do not have the competence to incur 
deficits autonomously but that this is the case in federal states, federal states need 
to deal with a moral hazard problem that is not an issue in unitary states.4 The 
federal government will regularly issue “no bail-out clauses” but they will not 
always be credible.5 In case they are not, constituent governments have incentives 
to incur deficits connected with the expectation to be bailed out should they be 
incapable of repaying their loans. Assuming that a “perfect” solution to this moral 
hazard problem is rather unlikely, the following hypothesis # 4 seems reasonable: 
C.p., aggregate government deficit will be higher in federal than in unitary states. 
A number of factors might, however, play in to mitigate the problem: if there are 
strong, disciplined parties that are active throughout most of the federation and 
one party is in charge of the federal as well as most of the constituent 
governments, then party leaders might prevent the state officials from 
externalizing the negative effects of over-borrowing (Rodden and Wibbels 2002). 
Notice that this mitigating effect is composed of institutional as well as non-
institutional aspects: the structure of the party system is a consequence of the 
heterogeneity of the country as well as its electoral institutions whereas the 
dissimilitude of federal and constituent governments is the decision of the voters. 
On a second aspect, namely the relevance of the number as well as the symmetry 
of constituent governments for subnational debts, there are competing hypotheses 
again: scholars emphasizing competition between constituent governments argue 
that a high number of similarly sized states would reduce the danger of non-
competitive cartels. With regard to the issue of over-borrowing, Wildasin (1997) 
argues that large states could become “too big to fail”. In other words: a large 
number of small states would let the federal government’s no bail-out promise 
appear more credible because the costs of letting a small state go bust are less than 
the costs of letting a large state go bust. On the other hand, it has been argued 
(Rodden and Wibbels 2002) that large member states can internalize more of the 
                                                 
4   The relationship between the central government and the lower units in unitary states might be 
more aptly described drawing on principal agent theory with its familiar monitoring problems. For 
such a view, see Seabright 1996. 
5   Rodden (2002, 672) points out that the creditworthiness of the federal level might be jeopardized if 
it does not bail out the constituent governments.   7
benefits generated by responsible fiscal policies. Similar arguments can be made 
with regard to the number of constituent governments: if the implementation of a 
responsible fiscal policy depends on the ability of the various governments to 
coordinate their behavior, the likelihood of successful coordination appears higher 
in small number than in large number settings. 
Further, the assumption that federal states have at their disposition borrowing 
autonomy and local governments of unitary states do not is most likely 
empirically false. Constituent governments have various degrees of borrowing 
autonomy at their disposition and a mitigating factor to hypothesis #4 could hence 
exist, if the borrowing autonomy of member states is seriously constrained 
(Rodden 2002). Finally, a no bail-out clause might be more credible if the federal 
government is itself subject to hard budget constraints. If monetary policy 
decisions are taken and implemented by a factually independent central bank, this 
might mitigate the problem of constituent government borrowing.  
A last, possibly mitigating, factor focuses on an institutional detail of many 
federations: their constituent governments are often represented in an upper 
chamber in which sparsely populated regions are often overrepresented (Samuels 
and Snyder 2001). If these areas are mainly populated by fiscally conservative 
farmers, this could lead to lower fiscal deficits (Rodden 2004). An empirical test 
of hypothesis #4 should, hence, explicitly control for these potentially mitigating 
factors. 
Over the last couple of years, there have been intensive debates whether the 
competition within federations would lead to a “race to the bottom” or, 
conversely, a “race to the top” (Wildasin 2008 is a concise survey of the pertinent 
literature on fiscal competition). The race to the bottom is expected with regard to 
norms and standards but also with regard to social and welfare programs. Given 
that competition with regard to social and welfare spending is at all possible, 
proponents of the race to the bottom view believe in the following hypothesis # 
5a: C.p., federations are expected to spend less on social and welfare programs 
than unitary states. Those arguing in favor of a race to the top might be arguing 
the exact opposite, hence hypothesis #5b: C.p., federations are expected to spend 
more on social and welfare spending than unitary states. 
Summing up the expected effects of federalism on fiscal policies as clearly 
unclear is not to exaggerate. Empirical tests are, hence, crucial.   8
Possible Effects on Government Effectiveness 
We move on to deal with possible effects of federal constitutions on a number of 
governance indicators. Over the years, dozens of governance indicators have been 
discussed so we need to constrain ourselves. Following Persson and Tabellini 
(2003), government effectiveness will be proxied for by the indicator of the same 
name that is part of the Governance Indicators published by the World Bank 
(Kaufmann et al. 2005). It combines perceptions of the quality of public service 
provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to policies. Secondly, their variable “graft” will be 
used which is supposed to reflect the level of corruption encountered in various 
societies. We thus need to deal with possible effects of federal/unitary 
constitutions on government effectiveness and corruption. 
Among other factors, government effectiveness will depend on the quality of the 
bureaucrats running the administration. It could now be that government jobs in 
provincial state capitals are not attractive for highly qualified personnel who 
prefer a job in the private sector but who would be ready to enter the government 
sector were they offered a job in a glamorous capital. Formulated as hypothesis 
#6b: government effectiveness is expected to be lower in federal than in unitary 
states. 
One aspect of government effectiveness is its capacity to credibly commit to its 
own promises. The number of veto players, i.e. those players who have the 
capacity to veto a new policy, is regularly higher in federal than in unitary states. 
This means that the consent of more players is needed if the government wants to 
renege from its own promises which implies that the capacity of federal 
governments to credibly commit to their own promises is higher than that of 
governments of unitary states. Regarding this aspect of government effectiveness, 
federations are, hence, expected to have advantages over unitary governments 
(hypothesis #6a).  
Resources spent on rent seeking cannot be allocated into more productive venues 
and constitute, hence, social waste. The question, then, is whether the amount of 
resources spent on rent seeking will be higher under federal or under unitary 
constitutions. Again, we encounter competing predictions: if one assumes that the 
resources spent on rent seeking are a function of the expected (change of) utility, 
less resources should be spent under federal constitutions because more actors 
need to be convinced (the number of veto players argument again). Yet, the time-
dimension might have a countervailing effect: since the existence of the   9
constituent states is constitutionally guaranteed under federal constitutions but the 
existence of sub-national governments is not guaranteed under unitary 
constitutions, rent seeking investments under federations might pay off over a 
higher number of periods and appear, hence, more attractive. 
Moving onto the question whether corruption levels will be higher under federal 
or unitary constitutions, there is one standard answer: constituent governments 
will be closer to the people, will be playing infinitely repeated games with local 
constituents – and will, hence, be subject to local capture (see, e.g., Tanzi 2000). 
Formulated as hypothesis # 7b: Corruption levels will be higher under federal than 
under unitary constitutions. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have introduced the 
concept of “efficient corruption”, implying that paying a sum once is sufficient to 
get the favor paid for. “Inefficient corruption” is thus corruption where more than 
one actor needs to be paid because there is a multitude of actors with some 
decision-making competence. Following this concept would re-enforce hypothesis 
#7b. 
The standard argument against the local capture hypothesis seems to be that the 
behavior of constituent governments is more transparent in federations and 
politicians are, hence, more accountable for their actions. This would imply that 
corruption is lower under federal constitutions (hypothesis #7a). Additionally, 
corruption can also be interpreted as a sign for the inadequacy of the relevant rule-
system; under dysfunctional rules, even welfare-enhancing activities will often 
require corrupt behavior. Following this assumption could lead to the following 
argument: since the constituent units of federal states are closer to the people, it is 
likely that their rules will be more adequate than under unitary states. State 
governments under federal constitutions can be conceptualized as principals, 
whereas state governments under unitary constitutions as agents of the national 
government. If one believes that principals are less prone to become corrupt than 
agents, this would be another aspect in favor of hypothesis # 7a. 
Regarding the expected effects of federalism on governance indicators, the 
expected net effects are, again, unclear. 
Possible Effects on Productivity 
This is also true for the expected effects of federalism on productivity levels. The 
argument that the higher number of veto players gives federations an advantage 
over unitary states in terms of commitment capacity has already been made in the 
last subsection. The higher commitment capacity might also be relevant here. It 
might increase total factor productivity directly. This is closely related with   10
another effect also expected from systems with a high number of veto players: 
policy swings will be less pronounced as a consequence of changes in the national 
government. A steady path of government policies allows private actors to form 
expectations over a longer period of time which might, in turn, increase overall 
productivity. Formulated as hypothesis # 8a: c.p., federal constitutions should be 
correlated with higher levels of productivity than unitary constitutions. But again, 
this hypothesis can be turned around: if exogenous shocks make swift reactions 
necessary, it appears plausible that federally structured states have more problems 
to react adequately to such shocks than unitary governments. 
The higher number of veto players in federal states is further conjectured to have 
an indirect effect via making other institutions stronger. The factual independence 
of central banks, e.g., is always in danger. If the consent of more actors is needed 
to tinker with central bank independence, this is less likely to happen. The higher 
factual central bank independence can itself have positive effects on the credibility 
of non bail-out promises as already discussed above. If federations are more likely 
to enjoy factually independent central banks, then inflation rates are likely to be 
lower, which would, again, be conducive to productivity. 
Further, the existence of a number of power centers always entails the possibility 
of power struggles and instability. This might have exactly the opposite effect and 
hypothesis # 8b thus reads that c.p. federal constitutions should be correlated with 
lower levels of productivity than unitary states. 
In our considerations on the possible effects of federations on fiscal policies, it is 
conjectured that federations might enjoy higher levels of legitimacy which might 
lead to lower deficits. This argument can be extended to productivity: if the (local) 
public goods provided in federations are closer to the preferences of their citizens, 
then this can also be interpreted as being tailored more according to the needs of 
the regional populations which should, in turn, be reflected in higher levels of 
total factor productivity. 
Beyond purely economic variables 
Public goods provided in federally organized states are conjectured to be more in 
line with citizen preferences than in unitary states. But this is not sufficient to 
come up with unambiguous predictions regarding the effects of federal structures 
on fiscal policies because the preference of the median member of society might 
not be identical over all societies. But if citizen preferences are, on average, taken 
more seriously in federations than in unitary states, this ought to be reflected in 
the general satisfaction of the citizens with their state. The corresponding   11
hypothesis #9 reads: C.p., citizens of federal states are expected to express higher 
levels of general satisfaction with their lives than citizens of unitary states. 
3  Review over the Empirical Results 
In their book-length study on the economic effects of constitutions, Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) analyze the effects of constitutional institutions on a number of 
variables, including (1) fiscal policy (in particular the size of the government, the 
composition of government spending, and the size of the budget deficit); (2) rent 
extraction by the government (in particular the perceived corruption of 
government and the effectiveness with which government provides public goods 
and services); and (3) composite measures of growth-promoting policies such as 
the protection of private property rights that should then be reflected in labor as 
well as total factor productivity. 
Persson and Tabellini did control for the effects of federally constituted states by 
relying on a federalism dummy. They report that the variable was insignificant for 
explaining differences in rent extraction (2003, 61) but significant for explaining 
differences in both labor and total factor productivity with federal systems doing 
better than unitary ones (2003, 71).  
More specific evidence concerning the effects of federalism on total government 
spending includes Rodden (2003) who shows that in countries in which local and 
state governments have the competence to set the tax base, total government 
expenditure is lower for a cross-country study covering the period from 1980 to 
1993. Feld, Kirchgässner and Schaltegger (2003) find that more intense tax 
competition, induced by a federal structure, leads to lower public revenue – at 
least with regard to Swiss cantons. 
Regarding the effects of federalism on governance indicators (Persson and 
Tabellini’s second group of dependent variables), results seem to be more 
ambiguous than ever. Treisman (2000) finds that federal states have, c.p., higher 
corruption levels than unitary states. Fisman and Gatti (2002), on the other hand, 
find that fiscal decentralization is strongly and significantly associated with lower 
corruption levels. These results only seem contradictory: Treisman relies on a 
dummy variable for federal states whereas Fisman and Gatti really deal with fiscal 
decentralization which they proxy for by the share of subnational spending over 
total government spending. It obviously matters a great deal whether one is 
interested in the effects of federalism or the effects of decentralized provision of 
public goods. A number of more recent papers have emphasized that 
decentralization can have various dimensions: Gerring et al. (2006) find that   12
unitarism and various governance measures are strongly – and positively – 
correlated. They do not only find significant statistical but also significant 
substantive correlation with the absence of corruption, bureaucratic quality, the 
number of phone lines, more trade openness, and fewer infant deaths as well as 
higher literacy rates. Dreher (2006) finds that higher subnational revenue, 
expenditure and employment is correlated with better values in governance 
indicators proxied for the rule of law, law and order, time to start a business as 
well as judicial independence. Freille (2006) comes up with the intriguing finding 
that both fiscal decentralization and constitutional centralization (i.e. unitarism) 
are simultaneously associated with lower corruption. Drawing on more data that 
has become available in the meantime, Treisman (2007, 235) now finds that the 
correlation between perceived corruption and federal structure is not robust at all. 
The available evidence concerning the effects of federalism (or decentralization) 
on income and growth is just as ambiguous. There are only half a dozen studies 
with cross-country evidence. Often, these studies are limited to OECD members. 
With a cross-section of 91 countries, Enikopolov and Zhuravskaya (2003) is an 
exception. They find that higher decentralization of revenue is correlated with 
lower real GDP per capita growth rates in developing countries. Davoodi and Zou 
(1998) report similar results based on decentralization of spending in 46 countries. 
Thießen (2003a, 2003b) finds the opposite for a cross-section of 21 developed 
countries and a panel of 26 countries. Feld et al. (2004) survey the literature in 
more detail including empirical results for individual countries. The results of 
these studies are just as ambiguous as those mentioned here. We argue that the 
ambiguity is not only due to the insufficient distinction between federalism and 
decentralization, but also to the very coarse measures that have been used for 
delineating federations.  
4  Seven independent Aspects of Federalism and Decentralization 
In order to test the hypotheses developed in section 2 of the paper, we need 
indicators for federalism and decentralization. In our companion paper 
(Blume/Voigt 2008), we reject the idea of having “the” single all encompassing 
indicator of federalism. Federal states are a very heterogeneous bunch and many – 
possibly important – differences would not be properly taken into account if we 
tried to compress all differences into one single dimension. Whereas the term 
federalism refers to a constitutional decision, the factually realized degree of 
(fiscal, political or administrative) decentralization is a consequence of policy 
choices made on the post-constitutional level. The degree of decentralization can 
thus be largely independent from the constitutional choice. We therefore work   13
with a number of different indicators focusing on different aspects of federalism 
and decentralization as this might permit us to tackle down the specific 
institutional arrangements that are responsible for differences in outcomes (if 
there are any).  
To answer the question whether this conception is reflected in the data, the 
companion paper runs factor analysis drawing on 25 indicators that have been 
used as variables for both federalism and decentralization. We find significantly 
more than two latent constructs indicating that the distinction between federalism 
and decentralization might still be too coarse. Seven aspects of federalism and 
decentralization can be separated from each other. These seven aspects represent 
some 70 percent of the variation in the 25 original variables: 
(1)  The first aspect merges the elements of democracy on the subnational levels 
(namely whether local and regional governments are elected) with the 
competence of the center to override decisions of the lower government 
tiers. We propose to call this aspect token executive elections. It is best 
represented by the original variable LOCEXE provided by Kearney (1999) 
which indicates whether local executives (but not legislatives) are directly or 
indirectly elected. 
(2)  The second aspect is primarily composed of the sub-national share of total 
expenditure and the sub-national revenues out of own resources. This covers 
one important aspect of fiscal decentralization. We propose to call it sub-
national expenditure. It is best represented by the original variable DECEXP 
from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks, which reflects 
the sub-national share of total expenditure. 
(3)  The third aspect centers on vertical transfers and we propose to call it fiscal 
independence. It is best represented by the original variable TRANSFER 
from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks, which is a proxy 
for vertical imbalance reflecting the transfers to sub-national governments 
as a share of sub-national government expenditures. 
(4)  The fourth aspect primarily deals with democratic elections on the sub-
national levels; it also includes a variable on the age of parties, thus 
reflecting sub-national democracy. It is best represented by the original 
variable MUNI from the Database of Political Institutions provided by the 
World Bank (Beck et al. 2000), which documents whether municipal 
legislatures and governments are locally elected. 
(5)  Aspect five is driven by two constitutional variables, namely the 
competence of the subnational levels to veto national legislation or to veto 
national legislation regarding finance issues. We propose to call it federal   14
veto. It is best represented by the original variable SUBVETO constructed 
by Treisman (2002), which deals with the competence of the constituent 
units to block (certain kinds of non-financial) legislation.  
(6)  The next aspect also deals with some core aspects of federalism, namely the 
question whether the states have some residual autonomy. But in addition, it 
also reflects some important fiscal aspects that we would expect federations 
to have. We propose to call it federal competence. It is best represented by 
the original variable REVSHARE also produced by Kearney (1999), which 
represents the right of the lower government levels to a portion of the 
revenues transferred to them in a regular and unconditional fashion. 
(7)  The seventh, and last aspect, deals with the composition of parliament. It 
thus deals, again, with an aspect of democracy, here not on the institutional 
level but rather on the policy level. It is best represented by the original 
variable GOVFRAC provided by Beck et al. (2000) and picked up by 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2006), which reflects the probability that two 
deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of 
different parties. The lower this value, the stronger the governing party is 
supposed to be. 
Summing up, the companion paper has identified seven independent components 
out of a data set of 25 variables usually used to measure federalism and 
decentralization, three of which deal more with democracy, (1, 4 and 7), two deal 
with fiscal decentralization issues (2 and 3) and only two (5 and 6) with 
federalism in a narrow sense. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the seven 
variables that will be used as proxies for the seven aspects identified with a factor 
analysis.  
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Name Description    N  Mean  Min  Max  SD 
locexe  local  elections  executive  46 2.17 0.00 4.00 2.01 
decexp  share of expenditures  85  22.15  0.37  65.39  16.87 
transfer  share of transfers  91  34.56  0.16  98.12  26.33 
muni  local  elections  77 1.31 0.00 2.00 0.83 
subveto  right to block legislation  133  0.33 0.00 2.00 0.66 
revshare autonomous  revenues  46 2.00 0.00 4.00 1.26 
govfrac  fractionalization of gov.  131  0.28 0.00 0.88 0.29 
 
Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations of these seven variables. Although a 
number of correlations are significant, not a single correlation is larger than 0.4. 
This indicates that the seven variables reflect seven dimensions of both federalism   15
and decentralization that are largely independent from each other. Moreover, table 
2 shows that the most frequently used federalism dummies reflect three of the 
seven dimensions in particular, namely fiscal decentralization, veto powers of 
subnational units in national legislation and revenue autonomy. The first of these 
three would conceptually rather belong to decentralization. 
Table 2:  Bivariate correlations of the seven aspects of federalism and 
decentralization as well as their correlations with federalism dummies 
Name locexe  decexp  transfer  muni  subveto  revshare  govfrac 
locexe 
 
1         
decexp  0.396* 
(34) 
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‘**’ and ‘*’ show that the Bravais Pearson correlation is significant on the 1 or 5 percent level 
respectively. # Mode of the federalism-dummies used by Elazar (1995), Kearney (1999), Watts 
(1999), Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1999), the Forum of Federations (2002), and the CIA World 
Factbook (2006).  
The main conclusion of this section is that indicators of federalism and 
decentralization should aim at keeping conceptually different dimensions such as 
revenue autonomy and constitutional veto powers apart. In the cross country 
analysis on economic effects in the next section, we therefore rely on the seven 
variables mentioned here as proxies for the seven aspects of federalism and 
decentralization in our companion paper.  
5  Estimation Approach and Results 
The estimation approach used is straightforward and follows directly from the 
theoretical part. We are interested in estimating the dependent variable Y that can 
stand for (i) various aspects of fiscal policy including the perceived legitimacy of 
the state, (ii) government effectiveness, (iii) economic productivity or (iv) 
reported levels of life satisfaction (“happiness”) of a country.    16
 
Yi = αi + β Mi + γ FDi + δZi + ui 
 
The fiscal policy variables are mainly taken from the data set used by Persson and 
Tabellini (2003), i.e. central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
(CGEXP), central government revenue as a percentage of GDP (CGREV), central 
government surplus as a percentage of GDP (SPL), and central government 
expenditures consolidated on social services and welfare as a percentage of GDP 
(SSW). An additional variable, the total government expenditures as share of GDP 
(TOTEXP) is taken from Heston et al. (2002). CGEXP, CGREV, and TOTEXP 
are chosen with regard to hypotheses 1 and 2, SPL with regard to hypothesis 4 and 
SSW with regard to hypothesis 5. Another effect related to fiscal policy as well as 
to government efficiency is conjectured to be the consequence of the Tiebout 
vision of federal competition: if the public goods bundles provided by the 
different constituent governments are more closely reflecting the preferences of 
the respective citizens, the legitimacy that citizens attribute to federal states is 
predicted to be higher than that attributed to unitary states. As no direct indicators 
of legitimacy are readily available, we use the answer to a question contained in 
the World Values Survey dealing with the preparedness to cheat on taxes (“Please 
tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: …. Cheating on tax if you 
have the chance [% “never justified” code 1 from a ten-point scale where 1= never 
and 10 = always]). On the one hand, this variable (CHEATING) is a crude proxy 
for legitimacy. On the other, it serves our purposes well as the conjecture is that 
higher degrees of legitimacy should have positive effects on fiscal variables (less 
expenditure, fewer deficits) as well as on productivity. The relationship between 
the proxy and the fiscal variables ought to be straightforward. The variable 
CHEATING is chosen with regard to hypothesis 3. 
The next endogenous variable on government efficiency (GOVEF) is taken from 
the Governance Indicators of the World Bank (Kaufmann 2005). It combines 
perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the 
bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies into a single indicator on a scale between 0 and 10, where 
higher values signal higher effectiveness. We take the average values for 1996, 
1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. The variable GRAFT according to the Governance 
Indicators of the World Bank is focusing on perceptions of corruption. It has 
values between 0 and 10, where lower values signal higher effectiveness. An   17
alternative measure is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency 
International, measuring perceptions of abuse of power on a scale of 0-10 (lower 
values meaning lower levels of corruption). We take the average over the years 
2000-2005. The variable GOVEF is chosen with regard to hypothesis 6 and the 
variables GRAFT and CPI with regard to hypothesis 7. 
As productivity measures with regard to hypothesis 8, we use the natural 
logarithm of output per worker (LOGYL) for the year 2000 and the natural 
logarithm of total factor productivity (LOGA) calculated for the year 2000 on the 
basis of a Cobb-Douglas-Function following the model of Hall and Jones (1999). 
Beyond the impacts that federalism and decentralization have on fiscal policies, 
governance indicators and overall productivity, defenders of decentralization 
could argue that having one’s government close would be a value per se, that it 
would be a good thing even if it did not have any productivity increasing effect 
(hypothesis 9). Therefore, we also look at cross country differences in “happiness” 
according to happiness surveys collected by Veenhoven 2004 and arranged on a 
10-0-scale with higher values signaling higher happiness (HAPPINESS). 
The vector M is made up of a number of standard variables conventionally used to 
explain the respective Y along the lines of Persson and Tabellini (2003).  
FD is one of our seven aspects of federalism and decentralization. Since the seven 
aspects are based on independent (uncorrelated) components identified by a factor 
analysis the regression coefficients would not change significantly if all the 
variables were put into one regression. Differences only occur due to differences 
in the country sample (because the seven different indicators are available for 
different countries); we therefore abstain from showing a regression with all seven 
variables in one estimation. As a benchmark, we also show a regression with a 
dummy variable for federalism. This variable is the mode of the federalism-
dummies used by Elazar (1995), Kearney (1999), Watts (1999), Derbyshire and 
Derbyshire (1999), the Forum of Federations (2002), and the CIA World 
Factbook (2006).  
The cross section analysis is performed by the TSLS technique while inference is 
based on t-statistics computed on the basis of White heteroscedasticity consistent 
standard errors. Our selection of instruments is influenced by Panizza (1999). The 
paper identifies the determinants of fiscal centralization drawing on Tobit 
estimates and some 60 countries. Depending on the specification, per capita 
income, the geographical size of a country, its level of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization and the realized degree of democracy proved to be significantly 
correlated with the degree of fiscal centralization. We therefore decided to use the   18
natural logarithm of real GDP per capita (LYP), the natural logarithm of total 
population in millions (LPOP), the index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(AVELF), and the age of democracy (AGE). 
The Z vector is composed of a number of control variables that can be 
geographical, historical, political, economic as well as institutional. In the 
theoretical section, it was pointed out that high expenditure levels could also be 
the consequence of preferences (of the median voter) in favor of costly public 
good bundles. It is, hence, necessary to control for voter preferences. Ideally, this 
could be done by controlling for the fiscal or ideological preferences of the 
electorate. Two measures were used here: the first one measures the degree of 
fiscal conservatism of the voters. The second one reflects ideological preferences 
of legislative and executive majorities. The first measure is taken from the World 
Values Survey. There are two variables, one aiming at the self-evaluation of the 
surveyed person, the other aiming at his or her normative ideal for the entire 
society.6 The second measure is taken from Whytock (2006) who coded political 
party affiliations of the executive and legislative branches according to the 
following scheme: -1 if both the executive branch and legislative branch are right-
leaning ideologically, (with the negative sign implying lower expected 
government spending) and 1 if both the executive and the legislative branch are 
left-leaning (and 0 otherwise).  
It further could be the case that federalism and decentralization only have 
substantial effects in combination with other constitutional institutions. 
Remember that Riker (1964, 1975) conjectures that there is a very close 
correlation between the party structure and the kind of federation in a given 
country [1975, 133: “… most writers identify the decentralization of parties as a 
correlate (or in some cases even a consequence) of the federal constitution.”] We 
propose to turn this argument around here: electoral systems are probably the 
single most important determinant of the number of parties to be expected in a 
country. The number of parties is, of course, logically correlated with the degree 
of party fractionalization. This implies that the electoral system determines the 
kind of federalism to be expected in a country. C.p., federal countries with 
                                                 
6   Here is the wording of the two questions: In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the 
right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? (Left Right 1-10); And 
now, could you please tell me which type of society your country should aim to be in the future. 
For each pair of statements, would you prefer being closer to the first or to the second alternative? 
A society with extensive social welfare, but high taxes. A society where taxes are low and individuals 
take responsibility for themselves (somewhat closer to, on a scale 1-5).   19
majority rule as an electoral system are expected to implement more centralized 
versions of federalism than countries relying on proportional representation. This 
entails the possibility that the electoral system displays an effect on economically 
relevant variables not only directly, but also indirectly via the kind of federalism it 
induces. This possibility is explicitly controlled for by including the variable MAJ 
in the Z-vector. Another intricate interdependence can also be derived from Riker 
(1975, 110). Federations need to produce a stable balance between the loyalty that 
their citizens feel to the constituent governments and to the central government. 
With regard to the U.S., Riker claims that the independence of the presidency was 
a crucial feature that permitted the development of a national orientation of 
loyalty.  C.p., federations coupled with presidential government forms will be 
more stable than federations coupled with parliamentary government. If, in turn, 
stability is conducive to higher productivity, then the form of government ought to 
be explicitly taken into account. This is done, by including the variable PRES in 
the Z-vector. 
Vaubel (1996) finds that the age of the constitutional court (for the entire sample) 
or the independence of the constitutional court from the organs of central 
government (for the industrialized states) had mitigating effects on centralization. 
The degree of control that the lower level governments had over constitutional 
change and the existence of fiscal referenda also had negative effects on the 
degree of fiscal decentralization. Inspired by this study, we propose to add the 
following variables on top of the dummy for federalism when estimating the 
determinants of fiscal centralization: (1) the degree of judicial independence that 
the highest court of the country factually enjoys (DE_FACTO_JI), (2) the factual 
relevance of direct democracy (DDI) and (3) the number of years over which the 
country has had a unitary constitution without interruption (UNIHISTORY). 
Finally, the Z-vector includes geographic controls (ASIAE, LAC, and SSA) and 
we also include legal origins (COMMLAW) as a control variable. 
The results are summarized in table 3. A number of findings appear particularly 
noteworthy: 
(1)  Institutional details clearly matter! The central motivation for running this 
study was our conjecture that a simple dummy variable for federalism 
would not do justice to the various dimensions connected with the term. 
Given that the dummy turns out as significant, our more precise estimates 
allow us to pin down which aspect of federalism drives the result. Even 
more interesting: with regard to the variables budget surplus (spl), 
expenditures and social services and welfare (ssw), cheating, government   20
effectiveness, graft and the Corruption Perceptions Index (cpi), the 
federalism dummy does not turn out to be significant while particular 
aspects of federalism are significant, some of them on a very high level of 
significance. 
(2)  With regard to total government expenditure (column 1 of table 3), the 
federalism dummy has a positive sign and is significant on the 5 percent 
level. Having a look at the seven aspects here used to proxy for both 
federalism and decentralization allows us to identify REVSHARE 
(representing the unconditional right of the lower government levels to a 
portion of the government revenues) but also GOVFRAC (representing the 
fractionalization of parliament) as the two variables driving this result. The 
effect of REVSHARE on total government expenditure is economically 
substantial: a one standard deviation increase in REVSHARE is connected 
with an increase of 2 percent in total government expenditure whereas a one 
standard deviation increase in GOVFRAC is still connected with an increase 
in overall government spending of 1.3 percent. This can be interpreted as 
some evidence in support of hypotheses 1b and 2b. 
(3)  The dummy variable indicates a positive correlation between federalism and 
output per worker as well as total factor productivity. Both effects can be 
ascribed to DECEXP (the sub-national share of expenditures). The higher it 
is the higher the two kinds of productivity. A one standard deviation 
increase of DECEXP is connected with an increase in output per worker of 
US $ 1185. This variable is, hence, also econometrically significant which 
can be interpreted as evidence in favor of hypothesis 8a. 
(4)  As already pointed out, the federalism dummy does not show any 
significant correlation with the budget surplus and the expenditures on 
social services and welfare. Drawing on the more fine-grained indicators, a 
different picture emerges: Both MUNI (indicating whether municipal 
governments are locally elected) and GOVFRAC are negatively correlated 
with the budget surplus, indicating that the presence of these institutional 
features leads to higher deficits. A one standard deviation increase in MUNI 
is connected with 2 point increase of the deficit as a share of GDP. 
GOVFRAC still has an effect of .8 points. This can be interpreted as 
evidence in favor of hypothesis 2b. 
(5)  Similar results obtain when government efficiency is the dependent variable. 
In none of the four proxies chosen does the federalism dummy turn out as 
significant. Analyzing, alternatively, the seven aspects leads, again, to a 
different picture. This is particularly so for the two variables taken from the 
World Governance Indicators: High levels of MUNI are correlated with   21
lower levels of government effectiveness and higher corruption. SUBVETO 
(proxying for the competence of the constituent units to veto certain kinds 
of legislation) has similar effects. Similar results emerge when CHEATING 
is used as the dependent variable. The results can be interpreted as a 
corroboration of hypotheses 6b and 7b. 
(6)  It seems noteworthy that of the seven aspects that are the result of the 
principal component analysis, only one is never significantly correlated with 
any of our outcome variables, namely LOCEXE. But taking into 
consideration that LOCEXE indicates the presence of token executive 
elections, this is in line with our priors. 
(7)  For explaining variation in both fiscal policies as well as government 
effectiveness, only four of the seven aspects are ever significant. Focusing 
on these two groups of outcome variables, the effects of these four aspects 
would not be welcomed by many observers: they lead to higher total 
government expenditures, to higher budget deficits, to higher spending on 
social services and welfare, to lower government effectiveness and higher 
levels of corruption. It is all the more astonishing that both output per 
worker as well as total factor productivity are positively correlated with 
some of the aspects analyzed here. One possible transmission channel could 
be via happiness: 
(8)  The correlation between our measure of happiness and the federalism 
dummy can be interpreted as empirical evidence in favor of hypothesis 9. 
Due to our approach, we are able to identify the specific institutional 
features provoking that result. A one standard deviation increase in 
DECEXP, TRANSFER and REVSHARE leads to fairly similar 
improvements in levels of reported life satisfaction (between 0.328 and 
0.527 points). It could be speculated that the gains in happiness more than 
make up for the problematic results with regard to fiscal policies and 
government effectiveness. But this is only speculation. 
 
 
6 Conclusion and Outlook 
This paper is based on the assumption that federalism and decentralization are two 
different concepts that cannot only be kept apart theoretically but that are 
empirically combined in manifold ways: there are federally structured states that 
are decentralized but also federally structured states with a high degree of 
centralization. On the other hand, unitary states can also be highly decentralized. 
This paper draws on a precursor (Blume/Voigt 2008) in which the authors identify   22
seven aspects of federalism/decentralization by drawing on 25 frequently used 
indicators of both federalism and decentralization. Based on these seven aspects, 
the economic effects of federalism and decentralization are estimated in this 
paper. 
The results show that institutional detail matters: drawing on a federalism dummy 
often leads to results that are very different from those reached by drawing on the 
seven aspects. In some cases, both the dummy and some of the seven aspects turn 
out to be significant. In these cases, use of the more detailed variables allows 
more detailed statements regarding the underlying causes provoking the effects. In 
other cases, the dummy does not show up as significant but one or two of the 
more precise variables do which is even more valuable as an additional insight. 
Three aspects seem to have strong effects on economic variables: electing 
municipal governments locally, endowing federal units to veto at least some 
federal-level legislation, and the fractionalization of parliament in terms of the 
heterogeneity of interests represented there. Interestingly, these three dimensions 
display problematic effects both on fiscal policy variables (they are connected 
with higher budget deficits and spending on social and welfare services) and 
government efficiency (being connected with lower levels of government 
efficiency and higher levels of corruption). Yet, both labor and total factor 
productivity are significantly higher in federally constituted states. It is speculated 
whether this is caused via the higher levels of happiness reported in federal states. 
These results should be interpreted cautiously: the number of available 
observations depends on the specific indicator which means that some of the 
differences could also be caused by differences in the sample (rather than the 
variable used). This calls for an extension in the number of available observations. 
Methodologically, the impact of both federalism and decentralization could also 
be ascertained by drawing on instances where countries have changed their 
institutional set-up. 
Thinking about possible policy implications of these findings, a new question 
arises: is it possible to set up institutions such that the advantages of federalism 
(decisions on local public goods reflecting the preferences of the local median 
voter to a higher degree) are preserved while its disadvantages are kept at bay? 
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These regressions are a modification of Persson/Tabellini 2003, i.e. they regressions of group I (fiscal policy) all include the following controls, not shown in the table: LYP, 
GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, PROP65, PROP1564, OECD; the regressions of group II (government efficiency) all include LYP, GASTIL, AGE, TRADE, LPOP, EDUGER, AVELF, 
OECD, PROT80; the regressions of group III (productivity/happiness) all include LAT01, FRANKROM, ENGFRAC, EURFRAC. The instruments of the first stage regression 
are LPOP, LYP, AGE and AVELF. The first number in a cell is the White heteroscedasticity-consistent ß-coefficient of the regression. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated 
parameter is significantly different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. R² is the adjusted R-squared of the regression and n the number of observations.  
Kommentar [lb1]: Hier war die 
Legende in der Tat falsch (Ihre Anmerkung 
9).  26
Appendix 2:  Descriptions of the Variables 
Many variables used in this paper are based on Persson and Tabellini (2003, PT) 
or Blume, Müller, Voigt, and Wolf (2008, BMVW).  
AGE: 
Age of democracy defined as AGE = (2000 – DEM_AGE) / 200, with values varying between 0 
und 1, source: PT and BMVW. 
AVELF: 
Index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 (strongly 
fractionalized) averaging five sources; sources: PT and BMVW. 
ASIAE: 
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in East Asia, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005). 
CGEXP: 
Central government expenditures as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government 
Finance-Expenditures in the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100; sources: 
PT and BMVW. 
CGREV: 
Central government revenues as a percentage of GDP, constructed using the item Government 
Finance-Revenues in the IFS, divided by GDP at current prices and multiplied by 100; sources: PT 
and BMVW. 
CHEATING: 
The variable is based on a question of the World Values Survey (“Please tell me for each of the 
following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something 
in between: …. Cheating on tax if you have the chance [% “never justified” code 1 from a ten-
point scale where 1= never and 10 = always]). 
COMMLAW: 
Dummy for common law legal origin, coded 1 if legal origin is common law, coded 0 if legal 
origin is any other. 
CPI: 
Corruption Perception Index measuring perceptions of abuse of power by public officials. Average 
over 2000 – 2005. Index values between 0 and 10, lower values meaning lower levels of 
corruption (recoded from the original version); source: Transparency International and Internet 
Center for Corruption Research (http://www.icgg.org/). 
DDI: 
Direct Democracy Index (DDI) as provided by Fiorino and Ricciuti (2007) drawing on various 
sources. The countries are classified as 1) radical democrat; 2) progressive; 3) cautious; 4) 
hesitant; 5) fearful; 6) beginner and, 7) authoritarian.  
DECEXP: 
Sub-National Share of Expenditures (% Total); source: IMF's Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS), 2002. 
DE_FACTO_JI: 
Factual independence of the judiciary; values between 0 and 1 with 1 signaling a high level of 
factual independence; source: Feld and Voigt (2003). 
EDUGER: 
Total enrollment in primary and secondary education as a percentage of the relevant age group in 
the country’s population, based on values for 1998 and 1999; sources: PT and BMVW. 
ENGFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks English as a native language; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
EURFRAC: 
Fraction of a country’s population that speaks one of the major languages of Western Europe:   27
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish; sources: PT and BMVW. 
FRANKROM: 
Natural log of trade share forecasted by Frankel and Romer’s gravity model of international trade 
which takes both a country’s population and its geographical location into account; sources: PT 
and BMVW. 
GASTIL: 
Average of indexes for civil liberties and political rights, each index is measured on a 1-to-7 scale 
with 1 representing the lowest degree of freedom. Countries whose averages are between 1 and 2.5 
are called “not free”, those between 3 and 5.5 “partially free” and those between 5.5 and 7 as 
“free”; sources: PT and BMVW. 
GOVEF: 
Government effectiveness according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank. Combines 
perceptions of the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to policies into a single indicator. Values between 0 
and 10, where higher values signal higher effectiveness; average values for 1996, 1998, 2000, 
2002, and 2004; sources: PT and BMVW. 
GOVFRAC: 
The probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of 
different parties; source: Beck et al. (2002). 
GRAFT: 
Graft according to the Governance Indicators of the World Bank focusing on perceptions of 
corruption. Values between 0 and 10, where lower values signal higher effectiveness; average 
values for 1996, 1998 and 2000; source: Kaufmann, D., Worldbank (2005): Governance 
Indicators: 1996-2004.
HAPPINESS: 
Happiness according to happiness surveys collected by Veenhoven 2004 and arranged on a 10-0-
scale with higher values signaling higher happiness. 
LAC: 
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Latin America, Central America, or the 
Caribbean, 0 otherwise; source: CIA (2005). 
LAT01: 
Rescaled variable for latitude, defined as the absolute value of LATITUDE divided by 90 and 
taking on values between 0 and 1; sources: PT and BMVW. 
LOCEXE: 
Records whether or not a country’s local executives are elected “4” if yes “0” otherwise, source: 
Kearney (1999). 
LOGA: 
Natural logarithm of total factor productivity, calculated for the year 2000 on the basis of a Cobb-
Douglas-Function following the model of Hall & Jones (1999); source: BMVW. 
LOGYL: 
Natural logarithm of output per worker calculated for the year 2000 following Hall & Jones 
(1999). 
LPOP: 
Natural logarithm of total population (in millions); sources: PT and BMVW. 
LYP: 
Natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in constant dollars (chain index) expressed in 
international prices, base year 1985; average for the years 1990 – 1999; sources: PT and BMVW. 
MAJ: 
Dummy variable for electoral systems, equal to 1 if the entire lower house in a country is elected 
under plurality rule, 0 otherwise. Only legislative elections (lower house) are considered; sources: 
PT and BMVW.   28
MUNI: 
0 if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally elected.  1 if the executive is appointed, 
but the legislature elected.  2 if they are both locally elected; source: Beck et al. (2000). 
OECD: 
Dummy variable, equal to 1 for all countries that were members of the OECD; source: OECD 
(2006). 
PRES: 
Dummy variable for government forms, equal to 1 in presidential regimes, 0 otherwise. Only 
regimes in which the confidence of the assembly is not necessary for the executive to stay in 
power (even if an elected president is not chief executive, or if there is no elected president) are 
included among presidential regimes Most semi presidential and premier-presidential systems are 
classified as parliamentary source: constitutions and electoral laws; source: PT and BMVW. 
PROP1564: 
Percentage of a country’s population between 15 and 64 years old among entire population; 
sources: PT and BMVW. 
PROP65: 
Percentage of a country’s population over the age of 65 in the total population; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
PROT80: 
Percentage of the population in a country professing the Protestant religion in 1980 (younger states 
are counted based on their average from 1990 to 1995); sources: PT and BMVW. 
REVSHARE: 
Measures whether a country’s central government regularly and unconditionally transfers a portion 
of national taxes to lower levels of government, “4” if both sub-national levels receive, “2” if one 
does, “0” otherwise; source: Kearney (1999). 
SPL: 
Central government budget surplus (if positive) or deficit (if negative) as a percentage of GDP, 
based on „DEFICIT (-) OR SURPLUS“as share of GDP average for 1990-1999; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
SSA: 
Regional dummy variable, equal to 1 if a country is in Sub Saharan Africa, 0 otherwise; source: 
CIA (2005). 
SSW: 
Central government expenditures consolidated on social services and welfare as a percentage of 
GDP; sources: PT and BMVW. 
SUBVETO: 
Dummy variable coded 1 if regionally chosen upper house of parliament has constitutional right to 
block legislation; source: Treisman (2002). 
TOTEXP: 
Total government expenditure as share of GDP. 
TRADE: 
Sum of exports plus imports of goods and services measured as a share of GDP; sources: PT and 
BMVW. 
TRANSFER: 
Vertical Imbalance; source: IMF's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), 2002. 
 